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CIVIL PROCEDURE-New Mexico State Courts Have
Concurrent Civil Jurisdiction Over Actions
Brought by Nonmember Indians for Torts
Committed on a Reservation: Wacondo v. Concha
I. INTRODUCTION
In Wacondo v. Concha,1 the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that
New Mexico state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over an action
brought by a member Indian against a nonmember Indian for a tort
committed on the reservation. 2 This controversial decision reflects the
ongoing struggle by states to assume greater control over Indian nations
located within state borders. This Note provides a brief history of tribalstate jurisdictional conflicts in both New Mexico courts and other jurisdictions, discusses and analyzes the rationale of the court, and finally
examines the possible effects and implications of the Wacondo decision.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On January 1, 1989, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Maureen Wacondo,
Gary Salas and two friends were leaving a New Year's Eve celebration
on the Jemez Pueblo Indian reservation.' While the group was still on
the Jemez reservation, John Concha, a member of the Taos Pueblo, 4
appeared suddenly and fired two shots through the rear window of the
car driven by Salas.5 Salas stopped the car, and both he and Wacondo
stepped outside. 6 Concha fired two more shots, hitting both Salas and
Wacondo. 7 As a result of the shooting, Salas died and Wacondo was
rendered a paraplegic for life.'

1. 117 N.M. 530, 873 P.2d 276 (Ct. App. 1994).
2. Id. at 534, 873 P.2d at 280.
For purposes of this Note, a "member Indian" is an enrolled member of a federally recognized
tribe acting on his or her reservation. A "nonmember Indian" is an enrolled member of a federally
recognized tribe acting on another tribe's reservation.
It is interesting to note that counsel for Defendant Concha declined to file for writ of certiorari,
recognizing that an adverse high court precedent would burden not only the Jemez Pueblo, but
also every Indian tribe in the United States. Telephone Interview with Counsel for Defendant, Staff
Attorney for the Indian Pueblo Legal Services (September, 1994).
3. Plaintiff's Complaint for Personal Injuries at 2, Wacondo v. Concha, 117 N.M. 530, 873
P.2d 276 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. SD-91-413-CV); Record at 2, Wacondo (No. SD-91-413-CV).
4. Wacondo, 117 N.M. at 531, 873 P.2d at 277.
5. Concha and Salas had argued earlier that evening. Record at 2.
6. Id.at 2-3.
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id. Concha was convicted in the New Mexico Federal District Court of voluntary manslaughter
and assault with intent to murder. Id. at 4. Judge John Conway sentenced Concha to two consecutive
terms of 108 months in federal prison at Englewood, Colorado, where Concha currently resides.
See United States v. Concha, No. 89-08JC-01 (D.N.M. Nov. 16, 1989), aff'd, 932 F.2d 975 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 253 (1991).
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Wacondo, a member and resident of the Jemez Pueblo, and Betty
Salas, 9 member of the Zia Pueblo and resident of Rio Rancho, filed suit
against Concha in the New Mexico State District Court of Sandoval
County.' 0 Concha moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction." The district court granted the motion to dismiss,
and Wacondo and Salas appealed. 2
III.

BACKGROUND

Prior to Wacondo, no court in the United States had considered whether
state courts have civil jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian's torts
committed in Indian country.' The following section provides a brief
examination of the principles upon which New Mexico courts and other
jurisdictions have settled similar disputes.
Retained Tribal Sovereignty
Indian nations of the United States possess the "inherent powers of4
a limited sovereignty which [Congress] has never ... extinguished."'
The sovereignty tribes retain includes the power of self-government and
the power to regulate internal social relations. 5 In matters of internal
self-governance on the reservation, tribal power is exclusive absent federal
limitations.' 6 This power 7 includes the right of tribes to create their own
laws and enforce them.'
Regulation of Indian tribes is the exclusive province of the federal
government." "Congress has ... acted consistently upon the assumption
that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a
A.

9. Betty Salas was the personal representative of the estate of the decedent, Gary Salas. Record
at 1, Wacondo (No. SD-91-413-CV).
10. Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages for wrongful death and personal injuries
suffered. Wacondo, 117 N.M. at 531, 873 P.2d at 277.
I. Id.
12. Id.
13. Indian country is defined as "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government .... ." 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1988).
14. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (recognizing that while Indian tribes are
sovereigns, such sovereignty is diminished by their dependent status and limited by Congress' plenary
authority); see also FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 231 (1982 ed.) (quoting
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978).
15. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983) (recognizing tribal power
to exclude all nonmembers entirely from the reservation or to place conditions on their presence);
see also Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322 (noting that a tribe retains the right to criminally punish its own
members).
16. See COHEN, supra note 14, at 236.
17. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978) (recognizing that tribal courts
are appropriate forums for civil disputes among "reservation Indians").
18. See McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973) (holding that Arizona
state individual income tax could not be imposed on reservation Indian whose entire earnings were
derived on the reservation); Rice v. Olsen, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945) (noting that the federal
government's policy of keeping Indians free from state jurisdiction is "deeply rooted in the Nation's
history"); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (I Pet.) 515, 562 (1832) (finding that the laws of the
state of Georgia could have no force within the boundaries of the Cherokee Indian Reservation).
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In certain situations, however, state courts may assert

jurisdiction over the conduct of non-Indians on a reservation, 20 and, in

exceptional situations, a state court may assert jurisdiction over the onreservation activities of tribal members. 21 In deciding whether they may

assert jurisdiction, both federal and state courts must consider two independent but related barriers to the exercise of state jurisdiction in
Indian country. 22 The two barriers are commonly referred to as the
preemption and infringement tests. Either test may preclude state juris23
diction over reservation activity.
B.

The Preemption Test
The preemption test determines whether existing federal law, in the
form of treaties or statutes, preempts state court jurisdiction in a particular
case. 24 In determining whether federal law or treaties preempt state action
involving Indian nations, preemption may be implied.25 State jurisdiction
over a cause of action arising in Indian country is preempted if such
jurisdiction interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests,
unless there are sufficient state interests to justify state intervention. 26
C. Infringement Test
Both state and federal courts have endorsed the infringement test to
determine whether state action will infringe on tribal sovereignty. 27 In
19. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (emphasis added) (noting that when Congress
wishes States to assume certain criminal or civil jurisdiction over Indians, it expressly grants such
authority).
20. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Res., 447 U.S. 134 (1980)
(permitting nondiscriminatory state tax on non-Indian and nonmember Indian smoke shop customers,
on the grounds that federal preemption does not permit tribes to market tax exemption); Moe v.
Salish, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (state may tax non-Indian purchases at reservation smoke shop).
21. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983) (holding that preemption did not preclude state
licensing requirement of member Indian liquor store owner, reasoning that adverse off-reservation
effects justified state intervention).
22. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980); St. Germaine v.
Chapman, 505 N.W.2d 450, 451 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
23. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 142.
24. See Chino v. Chino, 90 N.M. 203, 205, 561 P.2d 476, 478 (1977). Preemption questions
receive unique treatment in the context of federal Indian law due to the special circumstances
surrounding Indian sovereignty. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334
(1983) (rejecting the narrow focus of Congressional intent to preempt, because of the unique origin
of tribal sovereignty and the federal commitment to tribal self-determination); COHEN, supra note
14, at 273.
25. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334; White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at
143-44 (stating that ambiguities in federal law should be construed generously in favor of the Tribe
and implicitly preempting State action).
26. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 220-21 (1987) (concluding
that state interest in preventing organized crime from infiltrating tribal bingo did not justify state
intervention in light of compelling federal and tribal interests of Indian self-determination); Mescalero
Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334; White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 145; cf. Chino, 90
N.M. at 206, 561 P.2d at 479 (finding that when read together, the Treaty of 1852, the New
Mexico Enabling Act, and Public Law 280 preclude state civil jurisdiction of tort action arising on
reservation).
27. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (considering whether state court had jurisdiction
over a civil action brought by a non-Indian to collect a debt owed by Indian defendants for a
transaction occurring in Indian country).
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applying the infringement test, the court asks whether state action in a
particular case would infringe upon the right of the Tribe to make its
own laws and be governed by them. 28 The state or the moving party
bears the burden of proving that state jurisdiction will not infringe on
tribal autonomy.2 9
The New Mexico courts have modified the infringement test by mandating the consideration of three factors: (1) whether the parties involved

are Indian or non-Indian; (2) whether the cause of action arose on the
reservation; and (3) the nature of the interest to be protected.
IV.

RATIONALE AND ANALYSIS OF THE WACONDO

0

COURT

In Wacondo, the New Mexico Court of Appeals determined that neither
federal law nor tribal sovereignty precludes state court jurisdiction over
3
private civil disputes between member and nonmember Indians. ' The
court held that state courts have "concurrent jurisdiction [with tribal
courts] over torts committed within the boundaries of one pueblo by a
member of another pueblo."3' 2 The following section will discuss and
then analyze the Wacondo decision.
General Principles Governing Tribal-State Relations
The court of appeals began by recognizing that state courts generally
do not have jurisdiction over disputes that involve only member Indians

A.

or internal tribal policy. 3 Nevertheless, "[iun matters not affecting either

same
the Federal Government or . . . tribal relations, an Indian has the
34
citizen."
other
any
as
courts
state
in
sued
be
and
sue
status to
The Wacondo court's premise that an Indian has the same status to
sue and be sued in state court is supported where the Indian plaintiff

is suing a non-Indian defendant.3 5 Wacondo, however, involved a non-

28. Id. at 220.
29. See Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 800 F.2d 1446, 1448
(9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1051 (1987) (stating that, absent federal preemption, the
state need only show that state court action would not infringe upon tribal sovereignty); Crow Tribe
v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982); cf. Hartley
v. Baca, 97 N.M. 441, 443-44, 640 P.2d 941, 943-44 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 51,
644 P.2d 1040 (1982) (stating that after showing that the cause of action arose in Indian country,
the party bringing the action bears the burden of proof to show state court action will not infringe
on tribal sovereignty).
30. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 105 N.M. 514, 515, 734 P.2d 754, 755 (1987) (finding
that state had concurrent jurisdiction with San Juan Tribal Court over contract dispute between
an Indian and a non-Indian where contract was signed off of the reservation) (citing Chino, 90
N.M. at 206, 561 P.2d at 479); see also Hartley, 97 N.M. at 443, 640 P.2d at 943.
31. Wacondo v. Concha, 117 N.M. 530, 534, 873 P.2d 276, 280 (Ct. App. 1994).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 532, 873 P.2d at 278 (citing Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 389 (1976)).
34. Id. (quoting FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 379 (1942 ed.)); see also
Paiz v. Hughes, 76 N.M. 562, 566, 417 P.2d 51, 53 (1966)).
35. See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 467 U.S. 138, 148-49 (1984) (finding that
state court jurisdiction over suit brought by Indian tribe against a non-Indian corporation for breach
of contract did not infringe upon tribal sovereignty); Paiz, 76 N.M. 562, 417 P.2d 51 (affirmed
state court jurisdiction over suit brought by member Indian against non-Indian for tort occurring
on state highway within reservation limits, over which state had easement).
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member Indian defendant36 The courts have traditionally classified nonmember Indians with member Indians, not with non-Indians.17 Similarly,
tribal codes have long equated nonmember Indians with member Indians
rather than non-Indians.3 8 Furthermore, Congress recently classified nonmember Indians with member Indians when it amended the Indian Civil
Rights Act (ICRA),3 9 recognizing inherent tribal court criminal jurisdiction
over all Indians.4° This fundamental error of classifying nonmember
Indians with non-Indians undermines the entire Wacondo decision.
B.

Preemption Analysis

1. Public Law 280: An Expansion of Jurisdiction?
The Wacondo court first considered whether federal Public Law 280
preempted concurrent state court jurisdiction with tribal courts. 4' Public
Law 280 offers "any State," which was not expressly given jurisdiction,4
the option to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over actions between
Indians which arise in Indian country. 43 Defendant claimed that Public
Law 280 preempted state action." The court rejected Defendant's argument, reasoning that Congress enacted Public Law 280 to expand state
court jurisdiction, not to divest jurisdiction that the state would otherwise
4
possess.

1

2.

The Court Interpreted Public Law 280 Contrary to State and
Federal Precedent
The Wacondo court's conclusion that Congress enacted Public Law
280 only to expand state court jurisdiction ignores the language of the
statute, New Mexico precedent and U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Public

36. Wacondo, 117 N.M. at 533, 873 P.2d at 279.
37. See COHEN, supra note 14, at 356-57 (stating that disputes arising in Indian country between
member and nonmember Indians should preclude state court jurisdiction).
38. See LAW & ORDER CODE OF THE PUEBLO OF LAGUNA, ch. I, § 2(d) (1968) (defining Indian
"to be any person of Indian descent who is a member of any recognized Indian Tribe now
under
Federal jurisdiction"); BYLAWS OF THE CHEYENNE RIVER Sioux TRIaE, art. V, § 1(c) (1966)
("This

court shall have jurisdiction over all Indians."); TRIBAL LAW & ORDER CODE
OF THE ROSEBUD

Sioux TRIBE, ch. 2, § 1 (1963) ("The Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court shall have jurisdiction
of all
suits wherein the defendant is a member of any recognized Indian Tribe."); The Honorable
Tom
Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 225, 232 (1989)
(stating
that "[tihe jurisdiction statutes of the Navajo Nation provide that the tribal courts have jurisdiction
over all civil causes of action where the defendant resides within the Navajo Indian Country
or,
regardless of residence, has caused an action to occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Navajo
Nation. ").
39. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (Supp. III 1991).
40. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
41. Wacondo, 117 N.M. at 532, 873 P.2d at 278.
42. 28 U.S.C § 1360(a) (1988) (expressly conferring to Arizona, California, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Oregon, and Wisconsin civil jurisdiction over most Indian country located within each state).
43. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1324 (1988); Wacondo, 117 N.M. at 532, 873 P.2d at 278.
44. Wacondo, 117 N.M. at 532, 873 P.2d at 278.
45. Id. (citing People of South Naknek v. Bristol Bay Borough, 466 F. Supp. 870, 879
(D.
Alaska 1979)).
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Law 280 requires a state to obtain "consent of the tribe occupying the
particular Indian country . . . which could be affected by" state jurisdiction before assuming such jurisdiction.4 Furthermore, Public Law 280
requires a state that possesses an enabling act to amend its constitution
47
upon assuming jurisdiction under the statute. New Mexico has neither
gained consent from the Jemez Pueblo to assume jurisdiction under Public
4
Law 280, nor amended its Constitution. Therefore, New Mexico cannot
assume jurisdiction over suits between Indians arising in Indian country
49
under Public Law 280.

The New Mexico Supreme Court has stated that in enacting Public
Law 280, "Congress did specifically act . . . to give its consent to the
State to assume jurisdiction over the Indians within its boundaries, but
prohibitedthe State from exercising such jurisdiction until the State should
amend its Constitution or statute . . . removing any legal impediment to
such assumption of jurisdiction." 50 The supreme court reasoned that "two
self-governing bodies cannot have dual and coexistent jurisdiction and
control within the same territory at the same time.''
The Wacondo court's finding that New Mexico possesses concurrent
jurisdiction with tribal courts in the absence of any active steps to satisfy
Public Law 280 is also contrary to the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the statute. The Supreme Court's interpretation of Public
Law 280 clearly reflects that the statute was a delegation of authority
by Congress to the States of broad criminal and some civil jurisdiction
over "causes of action between Indians ... which arise in ... Indian
52
country situated within such State[s]. '
53
In Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, the Court examined whether
Public Law 280 preempted state court civil jurisdiction in Indian country4
jurisdiction.1
when a tribal law expressed consent to concurrent state court
The Supreme Court found that the tribal statute did not satisfy the

46. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(n).
47. 25 U.S.C. § 1324.
48. See Chino v. Chino, 90 N.M. 203, 206, 561 P.2d 476, 479 (1977).
49. See id.
50. Valdez v. Johnson, 68 N.M. 476, 477-78, 362 P.2d 1004, 1006 (1961) (emphasis added)
(holding that state court did not have jurisdiction over a civil suit between Indians for action arising
in Indian country); Your Food Stores, Inc. v. Village of Espanola, 68 N.M. 327, 331-32, 361 P.2d
950, 954 (finding that the New Mexico Enabling Act leaves no room for state court jurisdiction
over Indians or Indian lands, except where expressly granted by Act of Congress), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 915 (1961).
When New Mexico was admitted as a state into the Union, Congress required it to adopt an
Enabling Act, which essentially disclaims jurisdiction over Indian country and agrees that such
Indian country shall "remain . .. under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of
the United States." N.M. CoNsT. art. XXI, § 2.
51. Your Food Stores, 68 N.M. at 335, 361 P.2d at 956. The court reasoned that because New
Mexico has not taken the necessary action to acquire jurisdiction over Indian tribes, "it has determined
[that] it does not want to do so." Id. at 336, 361 P.2d at 957.
52. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1988) (requiring that the state gain "consent of the tribe" over which
it wishes to assume jurisdiction).
53. 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
54. Id. at 424-25.

Winter 1995]

WACONDO

V. CONCHA

explicit requirement of Public Law 280 for the state to obtain the consent
of the tribal members.55 The Kennerly Court reasoned that the purpose
of Public Law 280 was to insure that state court jurisdiction over civil
actions in Indian country would not be extended to the States until they
"manifested by political action their willingness and ability
to discharge
their new responsibilities. ,56

Consequently, according to both the United States and New Mexico
Supreme Courts, Public Law 280 is a delegation of criminal and civil
jurisdiction over Indian country offered by Congress to the states. New
Mexico does not possess such jurisdiction until it affirmatively adopts
Public Law 280. 51 To do so, New Mexico must amend its Constitution
and gain the consent of each tribe over which it wishes to assume
jurisdiction18 Until it does so, it should permit tribal courts to determine
their own jurisdiction.)
3.

Wacondo Rejects the Notion That Federal Policy Preempts
Concurrent State Court Jurisdiction
The Wacondo court rejected the argument that the federal policy
embodied in the Indian Self-Determination Act6o and ICRA 6' preempts
concurrent state court jurisdiction. The-court recognized that these statutes
embody a federal policy of promoting tribal self-government but stated
that, under the facts of Wacondo, exclusive tribal court jurisdiction was
unnecessary. The court reasoned that Defendant was not a member of
the Jemez Pueblo and that it would be in the best interests of the Jemez
Pueblo to provide a choice for its member, Plaintiff Maureen Wacondo. 62
The court further reasoned that exclusive tribal court jurisdiction would
create a great disincentive to non-Indians interested in reservation business.63
Thus, the Wacondo court found that federal policy did not preempt
concurrent state court jurisdiction.
4.

Improper Ex Parte Decision of Tribal Interests and an Illogical
Analogy to Non-Indian Business
The court's finding that state court jurisdiction was in the best interests
of the Jemez Pueblo is contrary to the federal policy of an exclusive
55. Id. at 429; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a).

56. Kennerly, 400 U.S. at 427 (recognizing "comprehensive and detailed congressional
scrutiny"
in situations where Congress has extended jurisdiction to States over Indian country).
57. Chino, 90 N.M. at 206, 561 P.2d at 479.
58. See id.
59. Cf. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15-16 (1987) (recognizing
exhaustion of
tribal remedies for actions arising on the reservation); National Farmers Union
Ins. Co. v. Crow
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985) (acknowledging the expertise of tribal courts
in interpreting
their own laws for actions arising in Indian country).
60. 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1988) (promoting Indian leadership and education).
61. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (enacted to further tribal self-government).
62. Wacondo, 117 N.M. at 532-33, 873 P.2d at 278-79.
63. Id. at 533, 873 P.2d at 279. The court also rejected an Enabling Act argument.
The court
reasoned that the parties did not raise the issue at trial and that the court cannot
consider new
issues presented for the first time on appeal. Nevertheless, the court stated that the
purpose of the
Enabling Act was not to deny Indians access to state courts. Id.
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64
relationship between the Tribes and the federal government. This policy
is based on the inherent conflict of interests between state and tribal
governments. In light of this conflict, the Wacondo court clearly overstepped its authority by determining the best interests of the Jemez Pueblo.
The trust relationship between the federal government and the Tribes
leaves no room for states to determine the best interests of tribal governments.
The court's explanation that exclusive tribal court jurisdiction over civil
disputes between member and nonmember Indians would weaken tribal
sovereignty and "create a great disincentive to non-Indians interested in
reservation business, ' 6 provides yet another example of the court's faulty
reasoning. 66 All parties involved in Wacondo were Indians. What possible
relevance does the court's allusion to non-Indian business have to the
affairs of Indians in Indian country? While states may have legitimate
interests in tribal enterprises to which states67 substantially contribute or
which create adverse off-reservation effects, that was not the case in
Wacondo. New Mexico does not contribute in any form to tribal courts
or to tribal police protection. Likewise, the effects of the dispute in
Wacondo between Indians on a reservation did not extend outside of
the reservation. If the dispute did affect the state, then the state's argument
for jurisdiction would be considerably stronger. New Mexico, however,
has no interest in private disputes between Indians arising on the Jemez
Pueblo Indian reservation. The considerable tribal and federal interests
a
absence of
in maintaining Indian self-government, coupled with the
68
jurisdiction.
court
state
for
room
no
leave
legitimate state interest,

Tribal Sovereignty and Infringement

C.

Wacondo Found That State Court Jurisdiction Does Not
Infringe Upon Tribal Sovereignty
After rejecting preemption as a bar to state court jurisdiction, Wacondo
69
considered whether state action infringed upon tribal sovereignty. The
court recognized that the first two factors of the infringement test weighed
1.

Arizona
64. See McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973) (holding that
were
earnings
entire
whose
Indian
reservation
on
imposed
be
not
could
tax
state individual income
31 U.S.
derived on the reservation); Rice v. Olsen, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945); Worcester v. Georgia,
(1 Pet.) 515, 562 (1832).
65. Wacondo, 117 N.M. at 533, 873 P.2d at 279 (emphasis added).
usually
66. The Indian Reorganization Act authorizes tribes to adopt a corporate charter which
as corporations
includes a "sue and be sued" clause to permit tribes to conduct commercial activity
more
without losing tribal sovereign immunity as tribes and to make tribal business enterprises
Tribe
Senaca-Cayuga
1994);
(Supp.
477
476,
§§
U.S.C.
25
See
businesses.
non-Indian
to
marketable
v. Oklahoma, 874 F.2d 709, 716 n.9 (10th Cir. 1989).
67. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (validating state severance
the enterprise);
tax on non-Indian oil lessee, reasoning that New Mexico provides substantial services to
Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
68. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1987).
test.
69. See supra text accompanying note 30, which lists the three factors of the infringement
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against state court jurisdiction; i.e., all of the parties involved were
Indians, 70 and the cause of action arose in Indian country. 7 However,
the court found that the third factor of the test, the nature of the interest
to be protected, "is the critical one to the analysis of the present case." ' 72
The court found that the Defendant failed to meet his burden of showing
how recognizing concurrent jurisdiction would infringe upon tribal sovereignty.7 3 Thus, the court held that concurrent state court jurisdiction
did not infringe on tribal sovereignty. 74
2.

The Burden of Proving No Infringement of Tribal Sovereignty
is Upon the Party Bringing the State Court Action, Not the
Defendant
Wacondo wrongfully imposed the burden of proving infringement upon
the Defendant. As a general rule, the state or the party seeking state
court action bears the burden of proving lack of infringement. 7 1 Thus,
the Wacondo court erred in not placing the burden upon the Plaintiffs
to show that state jurisdiction over the case did not infringe upon tribal
sovereignty.
Regardless of burden, state court jurisdiction in this case plainly infringes on the powers of tribal self-government. It subjects a dispute
among Indians arising on the Jemez reservation to a forum other than
the one that the Jemez Pueblo Indians have established for themselves.
Concurrent state court jurisdiction over tort actions arising on the reservation clearly infringes on the right of the Jemez people to create their
own laws and be governed by them.
D. Duro v. Reina: Jurisdiction Over Nonmember Indians In the
Criminal Context
1.

Wacondo's Use of Duro to Justify Its Analogy of Nonmember
Indians to Non-Indians
While no court has determined whether states have concurrent civil
jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian's torts committed on a reservation,
Congress has decided that tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian's crimes committed on another reservation. In Duro v.

70. The court noted, however, that Salas and Concha are nonmember Indians, "an increasingly
problematic group in regards to tribal jurisdiction." Wacondo, 117 N.M. at 533-34, 873 P.2d at
279-80 (citing Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal Jurisdiction, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 329, 355 (1989)).
71. Wacondo, 117 N.M. at 534, 873 P.2d at 280.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. In re Marriage of Wellman, 852 P.2d 559, 563 (Mont. 1993). "[Plarty seeking to bring such
an action in state court must show that state jurisdiction is not preempted by federal statute or
treaty and does not unlawfully infringe on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by [them]." Id. See also cases cited supra note 29.
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Reina,76 the United States Supreme Court considered whether states have
criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian's misdemeanor crimes
committed on another reservation .77 The Supreme Court analogized nonIndians to nonmember Indians, reasoning that neither are permitted to
participate in tribal government. 78 The Court thus held that Indian tribes
power to punish nonmember criminal acts arising on
do not retain the
79
reservation.
the
Wacondo found the Duro Court's classification of nonmember Indians
as non-Indians and its discussion of tribal authority over nonmember
80
Indians "apropos" in the civil context. Quoting Duro, the Wacondo
court stated that "[tiribes are not mere fungible groups of homogeneous
persons among whom any Indian would feel at home. On the contrary,
wide variations in customs, art, language, and physical characteristics
separate the tribes."'8 The court uses this variation among tribes to justify
its classification of nonmember Indians with non-Indians.
The Court's Reliance On and Understanding of Duro is
Misguided
On November 5, 1990, Congress passed an emergency amendment of
82
ICRA which effectively overruled Duro. In 1991, Congress made the
83
amendment permanent. One of these amendments states that "the inherent power of an Indian tribe [is] hereby recognized and affirmed, to
' ' s4 Congress also added
exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.
subsection four to ICRA, defining Indian to mean "any person who
would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as an Indian
under [the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153J."5 Congress specifically
chose to amend an existing statute which applied to tribal courts, recognizing that courts would view the creation of a new law as a delegation
86
of tribal authority over nonmember Indians. The amendments made
clear that tribes have always had misdemeanor criminal jurisdiction over
2.

76. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. §1301(2) (Supp. 1994).
77. Duro, 495 U.S. at 679. The case involved a nonmember Indian charged with the illegal
firing of a weapon on the reservation. Id. at 682. The Court recognized that Indian Nations do
not retain criminal jurisdiction to punish non-Indians for crimes arising in Indian country. Id. (citing
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)).
78. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693.
79. Id.
80. Wacondo, 117 N.M. at 534, 873 P.2d at 280.
81. Id. at 534, 873 P.2d at 280 (quoting Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 695 (1990), superseded
by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (Supp. 1994)).
82. Mousseaux v. United States Comm'r of Indian Affairs, 806 F. Supp. 1433, 1441 (D.S.D.
1992) (holding that the Congressional amendment of ICRA is to be applied retroactively), aff'd in
part and remanded on other grounds, 28 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 1994).
83. Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
84. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (emphasis added); Mousseaux, 806 F. Supp. at 1442.
85. Mousseaux, 806 F. Supp. at 1442.
86. Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN LAW
REV. 109, 112 (1992) (stating that a delegation "would not have reversed the holding in the Duro
case on the extent of tribal authority").
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all Indians and "that tribes clearly retain this jurisdiction as self-governing
entities and keepers of peace on their homesteads."87
The Wacondo court's contention that nonmember Indians should be
classified as non-Indians is contrary to the 1991 amendment of ICRA.
Furthermore, Wacondo ignores the surviving concept underlying Duro,
because civil authority over nonmembers involves situations arising from
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members.8 8 Thus, the surviving
portions of Duro, read together with the Congressional amendment to
ICRA, render Wacondo's rationale faulty.
V. IMPLICATIONS
New Mexico's acceptance of concurrent jurisdiction over on-reservation
disputes involving only Indians may have grave consequences for tribal
courts. The growing number of nonmember Indians8 9 creates a high
probability for concurrent jurisdiction cases for actions occurring in Indian
country. Unconditional access to state forums will place tribal courts in
direct competition with state courts. Such competition will impair the
Tribe's authority over reservation affairs, infringe on tribal sovereignty,
and possibly lead to the demise of the tribal court system.
It is not reasonable to authorize New Mexico courts to adjudicate tort
actions arising on the reservation between Indian people. New Mexico
courts apply a traditional choice of law system. 90 Thus, in tort and
contract actions, New Mexico courts apply the law of the place where
the tort was committed or where the contract was entered into. Permitting
concurrent state court jurisdiction with tribal courts over such civil disputes
will impose an unreasonable and unwarranted burden upon state court
judges in the application of tribal law. It is well recognized that tribal
court judges are experts in the application of tribal law. 9' State courts
should abstain where tribal law will be applied. Failing to abstain will
undermine the authority of the tribal court system and lead to a cor87. Mousseaux, 806 F. Supp. at 1443 (citing 137 CONG. REC. E2165-04 (statement
of Rep. Geo.
Miller of California)).
88. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 687-88 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301(2)
(Supp. 1994).
89. See generally Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, U.S. 49 (1978) (concerning Santa
Clara Pueblo
wife and Navajo Indian husband residing on Santa Clara Pueblo Indian Reservation);
Arizona ex
rel Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969) (noting that Cheyenne Indian
husband and
Navajo Indian wife resided together on the Navajo Indian Reservation); Foundation
Reserve Ins.
Co. v. Garcia, 105 N.M. 514, 734 P.2d 754 (1987) (finding that Cherokee wife
and San Juan
Pueblo husband lived together on the San Juan Pueblo Indian Reservation); Hennessy
v. Dimmler,
394 N.Y.S.2d 786, 791 (Onondaga County Ct. 1977) (noting that an estimated
200 nonmember
Indians reside on Onondaga Territory).
90. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hyatt, 117 N.M. 461, 464, 872 P.2d 879, 882 (1994)
(recognizing
the New Mexico traditional choice of law lex loci contractus rule); First Nat'l Bank
of Albuquerque
v. Benson, 89 N.M. 481, 481-82, 552 P.2d 1288, 1288-89 (Ct. App.) (rejecting the
modern significant
contacts choice of laws rule and affirming the New Mexico rule which applies
the law of the place
of the injury or lex loci delicti), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619 (1976).
91. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985)
(acknowledging
that exhaustion of remedies in tribal court will "provide other courts with the
benefit of their
expertise").
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92
responding decline in tribal culture. When one understands the fundamental value differences between tribal and state court goals, the
influence is dramatic. 93 Continued diminishment of tribal sovereignty will
94
eventually destroy tribal culture. It will force Indian people to replace
the tribal court objectives of harmony between people and nature with
95
the adversary systems of state courts.
issue
On the other hand, Wacondo may force Congress to address the
after Duro.96
did
it
as
Indians
nonmember
over
jurisdiction
of civil
Congress may recognize the growing number of nonmember Indians, and
amend legislation, such as Public Law 280, to explicitly recognize the
exclusive nature of tribal court authority over civil disputes among all
Indians including nonmember Indians. Refraining from concurrent jurisdiction will lessen the burden upon the already flooded state court
system and will insure that the governmental, legal and cultural interests
of the tribes are protected. Validating the tribal court system is essential
to tribes to maintain their status as sovereign nations.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The New Mexico Court of Appeals made four considerable errors in
Wacondo v. Concha. First, it improperly classified nonmember Indians
as non-Indians. Second, it ignored the legislative purpose of Public Law
280 as well as the United States' and the New Mexico Supreme Courts'
interpretations of that law. Third, it wrongly imposed the burden of
proving infringement of tribal self-government upon Defendant. Finally,
Wacondo disregarded Congress' affirmation of retained tribal sovereignty
over all Indians. Consequently, New Mexico now permits Indians to settle
internal disputes occurring on Indian reservations in an adversary system
foreign to the ideals of Indian tribes. This result is not only contrary
to federal policy of Indian self-government, but it also threatens the
Indian way of life.
JOHN J. HARTE

92. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387-88 (1976) (recognizing that state court
jurisdiction would plainly interfere with tribal self-government exercised through the tribal courts).
93. Tso, supra note 38, at 233.
94. Id.at 232.
95. See Chino v. Chino, 90 N.M. 203, 206, 561 P.2d 476, 479 (1977); Tso, supra note 39, at
233-234.
96. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.

